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DUE PROCESS
may create enforceable liberty interests in the prison setting. 148
The New York Court of Appeals, in Doe v. Coughlin,
149
found that if regulations exist that promise certain benefits, so
long as participation in the program is not contingent upon
subjective factors, a protected interest may arise. 150 Therefore,
the state and federal courts appear to be consistent in their
application of due process to this right potentially arising in the
prison context.
Children's Village v. Holbrook151
(decided November 21, 1991)
Children's Village, a not-for-profit child care agency, brought
an article 78 proceeding appealing the denial of its application for
a special permit to operate a group home in a single-family
residential district. 152 The court held the zoning ordinance to be
facially invalid under the due process clause of the New York
State Constitution153 insofar as it restricted the size of a
"functionally equivalent" family while not similarly restricting
the size of a traditional family. 154
Children's Village proposed to operate a group home for up to
ten abused or neglected adolescent boys in an R-22 zoning district
in the Town of Clarkstown. Under the Town Zoning Ordinance,
single-family detached residences are permitted as of right in an
R-22 district. 155 "Family" is defined as "[a]ny number of
individuals related by blood, marriage or adoption [or not more
148. Id.
149. 71 N.Y.2d 48, 518 N.E.2d 536, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1987), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 879 (1988).
150. Id. at 55, 518 N.E.2d at 540-41, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 786-87 (when a
state adopts programs where there is an expectation of early release from
prison or a family reunion, an expectation of certain rights arises, however, if
there is a regulatory scheme attached to that program, no legitimate
expectation exists).
151. 171 A.D.2d 298, 576 N.Y.S.2d 405 (3d Dep't 1991).
152. Id. at 299-300, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
153. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
154. Children's Village, 171 A.D.2d at 300-01, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 406-07.
155. Id. at 299, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
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than five (5) individuals who are not so related], living together
in a single housekeeping unit."1 56 Agency Group Homes are
permitted within an R-22 district only by special permit issued by
the Town Board. 157
Children's Village applied for such a permit and the application
was denied. It then brought an article 78 proceeding, which was
converted to an action for a declaratory judgment by the supreme
court. The supreme court concluded that plaintiffs proposed
group home was sufficiently family-like in structure as to
constitute a family for purposes of the zoning ordinance. 158 The
Town of Clarkstown appealed.
The appellate division found it unnecessary to decide whether
the structure of plaintiffs group home represents the functional
equivalent of a biological family. 159 Rather, the court held that
the ordinance's definition of family is unconstitutional. 160 The
court found that a definition which "restricts the size of a
functionally equivalent family to five individuals not 'related by
blood, marriage or adoption' . . . while not similarly restricting
the size of a traditional family comprised of persons so related"
violates the due process clause of the state constitution. 161 The
court further rejected the town's contention that the provision
requiring group homes to obtain a special permit in a single-
family residential district is enforceable as severable from the
156. Id.
157. Id. at 299-300, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
158. Id. at 300, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
159. Id. The Town conceded that under the state constitution a group home
for children that resembles "a traditional family in every sense except for the
absence of a biological or legal relationship among the occupants cannot
validly be excluded from a single-family residence zoning district." Id.
However, the town contended that because the supervision of the children will
be accomplished by a rotating professional staff of child care specialists and
not by house parents, the proposed group home so deviates from the functional
equivalent of a biologically unitary family, that this, therefore, permits a
different, stricter zoning regulation. Id. See also Crane Neck Ass'n v. New
York City/Long Island County Servs. Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d
1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 804 (1984).
160. Children's Village, 171 A.D.2d at 300, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
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ordinance's definition of family. 162 The court reasoned that,
"without a constitutionally valid definition of family in the
Zoning Ordinance, its specific regulation of group homes is also
objectionable in that it may be applied to 'exclude [from the class
of occupancies not requiring a special permit] households that due
process requires be included.' 163
It is well settled law that a family-like agency group home may
not constitutionally be made subject to special zoning regula-
tions.164 Consequently, the provision requiring agency group
homes to obtain a special permit, which does not differentiate
between functionally equivalent group homes and institutional
group homes, is invalid and unenforceable. 
165
The Federal Due Process Clause offers no similar protection to
the non-traditional family. 166 The United States Supreme Court
upheld an even more restrictive zoning ordinance which limited
land use in the Village of Belle Terre, New York to one-family
dwellings. In Belle Terre, family was defined as "'[o]ne or more
persons related by blood, adoption or marriage, living and
cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of
household servants,"' with an exception for no more than two
unrelated persons. 167 The Court found that no fundamental right
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution was involved. 168 Rather,
the zoning ordinance was held to be a valid exercise of the police
power -- a power that is "ample to lay out zones where family
values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and
clean air make the area a sanctuary for people." 169 The exclusion
of the "regimes of boarding houses, fraternity houses and the
162. Id. at 301, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
163. Id. (quoting McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544, 550,
488 N.E.2d 1240, 1243, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128, 132 (1985)).
164. See Group House of Port Washington, Inc. v. Board of Zoning and
Appeals of North Hempstead, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 380 N.E.2d 207, 408
N.Y.S.2d 377 (1978); City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313
N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974).
165. Children's Village, 171 A.D.2d at 301, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
166. Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
167. Id. at 2.
168. Id. at 7.
169. Id. at 9.
8591992]
3
et al.: Due Process
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
TOURO LAW REVIEW
like" was deemed reasonable, as they tend to present urban
problems. 170
The New York Court of Appeals subsequently invalidated a
similar ordinance on state due process grounds. 171 The New
York court found that "restricting occupancy of single-family
housing based on the biological or legal relationships between its
inhabitants bears no reasonable relationship" to the legitimate
goals of zoning legislation. 172 In order not to "exclude any
households that due process requires be included" such an
ordinance must contain an "alternative definition of family"
which would include "any number of unrelated persons living
together" as the "functional equivalent of a traditional
family. "173
Thus, the New York State Constitution provides protection un-
der its due process clause that is not available under the parallel




(decided January 15, 1991)
Non-judicial state court employees 175 challenged the constitu-
170. Id.
171. See McMinn, 66 N.Y.2d 544, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128
(1985).
172. Id. at 549, 488 N.E.2d at 1243, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
173. Id. at 550, 488 N.E.2d at 1243-44, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 132 (citing
Group House of Port Washington, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d at 272-73, 380 N.E.2d at
210, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 380; City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300,
305-06, 313 N.E.2d 756, 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974)).
174. 565 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1991).
175. Id. at 423. Petitioners were the collective bargaining representatives of
the state court employees. Id. In addition, other labor organizations
representing non-judicial employees of the New York State Court system
brought a claim to federal court asserting that chapter 190 was unconstitutional
under the contracts clause of the United States Constitution. Association of
[Vol 8
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